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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990739-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from conditional guilty pleas to the second-degree felony charges of 
operating a clandestine laboratory, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37(d)-4(l)(a) and/or 
(b) (1998); and illegal possession and/or use of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and -8(2)(d) (Supp. 1999) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Are charges "pending" for purposes of the 120-day intrastate speedy trial statute when 
an information has not yet been filed? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law which are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Harlev, 1999UTApp. 197,ffl[9,10,982 P.2d 1145: State v. Preece. 971 
P.2d 1,4 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in Addendum B, including: Utah 
Code Ann. §77-29-1(1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying Utah's 
statute involving the intrastate speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the 
relevant dates and corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows: 
7/23/98 Defendant is arrested and booked on charges of operating a 
clandestine laboratory, possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of an incendiary device, and driving on a 
revoked/suspended license (R. 50). 
08/03/98 A document entitled "Information on Parole Violation" is 
generated, alleging that defendant violated his parole by 
manufacturing a controlled substance, manufacturing an 
explosive device, and possessing an explosive, firearm or \ 
dangerous weapon (R. 54). Defendant's parole is revoked and 
he is returned to prison (R. 74). 
10/06/98 Defendant files a "Notice and Request for Disposition of 
Pending Charges[f under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), < 
seeking disposition of "[c]harges of poss of a controld [sic] 
substance, poss of bomb/incendiary [sic] [, and] poss of a 
clandestine lab" (R. 51) (in Add. C). 
2 
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03/02/99 An information is filed charging defendant with operating a 
clandestine lab (with an enhancement), possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (with an enhancement) (R. 
1-3) (in Add. C).1 
04/07/99 Defendant moves pro se to dismiss the charges for lack of a 
speedy trial, claiming the 120-day period began to run when he 
filed his disposition request on Oct. 6, 1998, and ended on 
February 3, 1999 (R. 15-19). 
04/19/99 A hearing is held on defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 46). 
04/30/99 The magistrate enters findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 57-59). 
05/03/99 The magistrate enters an order denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss (R. 60). 
07/06/99 After bindover, defendant, through new counsel, files a motion 
to renew his motion to dismiss, seeking to have the district court 
judge review the magistrate's decision (R. 132-37). 
07/16/99 The district court denies defendant's motion to dismiss and 
adopts/approves the findings, conclusions and order of the 
magistrate (R. 151-52) (in Add. D). 
07/20/99 Defendant enters his guilty pleas to two counts: 1) operating a 
clandestine lab, and 2) possession of a controlled substance, 
enhanced due to a prior conviction (R. 216-17). The pleas are 
entered pursuant to Sery, preserving for appeal the statutory 
speedy trial issue, among others (R. 216-19).2 To avoid 
*Two of the charges were enhanced because, among other things, the lab was 
found within 500 feet of a residence and defendant had a previous conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance (R. 1-3). Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(d) and 58-
37d-5(f). 
2
 State v.Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). 
3 
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difficulties arising from defendant's impending release from 
prison due to the imminent completion of his sentence for an 
unrelated matter, the lower court immediately sentences 
defendant on one of the charges, imposing a sentence of one-to-
fifteen years for operating a clandestine lab, and orders 
preparation of a presentence report for use in sentencing 
defendant for possession (R. 218-19). 
08/20/99 The lower court sentences defendant to a term of one-to-fifteen 
years on the possession charge, to run concurrently with the 
sentence on the clandestine lab conviction (R. 240-41). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 23, 1998, defendant was a parolee subject to the supervision of Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP&P) (R. 334:17-18). After being informed by police that two 
independent tips and officer surveillance suggested that defendant was involved in a 
methamphetamine lab, AP&P conducted a long-overdue home visit on defendant's residence 
and found in his garage a large, locked steel box (R. 334:8-13, 18-22, 48-51, 53-56, 65-66, 
103-04, 113). Someone living at the home identified it as belonging to "dad," and the key 
which opened the box was on a ring marked with the word "DAD" (R. 334:55-56, 62, 82, 
105,114; 141). Inside the box was a quantity of items, including glassware, chemicals, and 
explosives, associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 334: 22-23, 62-63; < 
143-44). Also in the box was an item identified as a "shotgun" and described as a small, 
homemade object three-to-four inches long that can be "fired from inside the hand by simply 
pounding down on the back of a little loaded 12-[gauge] shell" (R. 334: 85; 337: 6-7, 11). 
4 
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Based on the items seized from defendant's garage, the previous independent observations 
of the police officers, and the independent tips, defendant was arrested (R. 334: 80, 84-85). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Utah's intrastate speedy trial statute applies only to "pending" informations or 
indictments. Because no information had been filed at the time defendant filed his speedy 
trial request, the statute was not properly invoked and the request did not trigger the 120-day 
period. To rule otherwise would impose a 120-day statute of limitations on the charging and 
trial of all incarcerated defendants, even though the incarceration is based on unrelated 
charges. Such a rule would also require commencement of a criminal prosecution as early 
as the date of a defendant's arrest and unreasonably bind the prosecution's ability to 
investigate, prepare, file, and prosecute felony cases. Both the plain language of the speedy 
trial statute and Utah Supreme Court case law is to the contrary. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL DID 
NOT INVOKE THE SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE BECAUSE NO 
INFORMATION WAS "PENDING" AT THE TIME, AS REQUIRED 
BY THE STATUTE 
A. Introduction 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the 
trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), Utah's intrastate speedy trial 
statute. This provision, which outlines defendant's statutory speedy trial right, provides: 
5 
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(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(Emphasis added) (in Add. B). 
Defendant argues that charges were necessarily "pending" against him on July 23, 
1998, when he was arrested for three reasons: 1) because the case had been "adequately 
investigated" before his arrest, implying that the State had all the information it needed to 
charge and prosecute him at that point; 2) because the same charges were later included in 
the parole violation information which served as the basis for revoking defendant's parole; 
and 3) because defendant referred to the same charges in his written disposition request. Br. 
of Aplt. at 5, 8-9. Consequently, defendant argues, the 120-day period started running from 
the time he filed his demand on October 6, 1998, and any delay thereafter was not 
attributable to "good cause" under the statute, and therefore required dismissal of all charges. 
w 
Because this claim involves statutory interpretation, it presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421.424 (Utah 1991). This Court need * 
3Defendant does not claim that his constitutional rights to a speedy trial were 
violated. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. ( 
6 
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look only at the plain language of the statute to decide the issue as that language is clear and 
unambiguous. State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1998); State v. Harlev. 1999 
UT App 197, ^ 10, 982 P.2d 1145 (it is well settled that '"when faced with a question of 
statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute."1). The Court may 
"resort to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language is ambiguous." State 
v. Masciantonio. 850 P.2d 492,493 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Background 
Utah's speedy trial statute is designed to promote the prompt prosecution of charges 
against prisoners, to ensure trial while witnesses are available and memories are fresh, and 
to more precisely define "speedy trial" as it applies under our state constitution. State v. 
Viles. 702 P.2d 1175.1176 (Utah 1985): State v. Wilson. 22 Utah 2d 361.453 P.2d 158,159 
(Utah 1969) (addressing purpose of previous version of statute). The statute outlines the 
responsibilities of both parties in bringing about a speedy resolution of charges. While the 
prosecution carries the ultimate burden of bringing the matter to trial within 120 days of the 
filing of a disposition request, defendant has the threshold burden of ensuring that the statute 
is properly invoked. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915-16 (Utah 1998) (when prisoner 
delivers a written notice pursuant to the statute, then the prosecutor has an affirmative duty 
to have the matter heard in 120 days; 120 days does not start until notice is properly 
delivered under the statute); Petersen. 810 P.2d at 424 (describing prosecutor's burden); 
State v. Wright. 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah 1987) (the request must be appropriately sent 
7 
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to the right people and contain an appropriate demand in order to be effective); Viles, 702 
P.2d at 1175 (the burden is on the prisoner to give proper notice before being entitled to 
have charges disposed of in the statutory period); Wilson, 453 P.2d at 160 (describing 
prosecutor's burden). Moreover, once a defendant has properly invoked the statute to start 
the 120-day period running-shifting the burden to the prosecution to ensure a timely trial-he 
must not unduly delay matters or the delay may be charged against him and the 120-day 
period extended. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. 
C. The Statute's Plain Language Requires That Charges Be Filed Before A 
Disposition Request Will Trigger The Speedy Trial Period 
Under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, a written request for 
disposition is effective only if there is "pending against the prisoner in this state an[] untried 
indictment or information^]" and the written request: 1) includes reference to the court in 
which the charge is "pending"; and 2) seeks disposition of the "pending" charge. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (emphasis added). Without a pending information, a defendant is unable 
to invoke the statute. Wright, 745 P.2d at 451 (defendant's ability to invoke the statute must 
first be "triggered" by having a charge filed against him) (citing State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 
2d 435, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (1974)). 
Black's Law Dictionary 1134 (6th ed. 1990), defines "pending" as follows: 
Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusions of; prior to the 
completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in process of settlement or adjustment. > 
Awaiting an occurrence or conclusion f action, period of continuance or 
indeterminacy. Thus, an action or suit is "pending" from its inception until the 
rendition of final judgment. 
8 
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Thus, an action must have "begun" or commenced before it is "pending." 
This interpretation is supported by law in this and other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Utah 
R. Crim P. 5 (requiring that "all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or 
infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information or the return of an indictment. 
Prosecution by information shall be commenced before a magistrate having jurisdiction of 
the offense alleged to have been committed unless otherwise provided by law."); State ex rel. 
Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982) (prosecution of a felony by information 
requires several steps: 1) screening of the case by the prosecutor; 2) authorization of the 
prosecution, shown by the signature of the prosecutor on the information; 3) presentment of 
the information to a magistrate; 4) subscribing and swearing to the information by the 
complaining witness; and 5) filing of the information with the magistrate or court clerk); 
State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 312 (Utah 1975) (citing with approval a Kansas case noting 
that a request for disposition of a detainer under former section 77-65-1 is ineffective to 
invoke the benefits of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act where it was 
filed in a court which did not have criminal charges pending against him because the 
information had not yet been filed) (discussing Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107,402 P.2d 789 
(1965)); see also State v. Trujillo. 117 Utah 237, 214 P.2d 626, 631 (1950) (noting that an 
accused "is brought under the power of the district court by the filing of the information"); 
Johnson v. McCauehan. Carter & Scharrer. 672 P.2d 221,222 (Colo. App. 1983) (an action 
9 
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is "pending" only after it is commenced by either filing a complaint with the court or by the 
service of a summons). 
Defendant's interpretation of "pending," on the other hand, creates a jurisdictional 
problem. In Utah, felony criminal prosecutions are commenced by the filing of an 
information. Utah R. Crim. P. 5; State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60, 61 (1970). 
The statute directs the court to dismiss all charges if trial does not occur within 120 days after 
proper notice. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). However, until the filing of an information, 
the court has no jurisdiction over the prosecution and cannot dismiss any charges because 
there is nothing to dismiss. 
Also, under defendant's interpretation, the full 120 days could run before the 
information is filed, as occurred here, thereby preventing the State from ever filing or trying 
defendant on the charges. This, in effect, creates a 120-day statute of limitations in favor of 
defendant for any crime, discovered or not, to commence on the happening of the latter of 
two events: defendant's arrest, and the date of delivery of the written disposition request to 
the proper authority. The prosecution could be barred from filing the charges, even though 
the applicable statute of limitations had not yet run. * 
Imposing such a statute of limitations would, in many cases, require that a prosecutor 
file charges before he or she was ready, thereby hampering felony investigations and 
increasing the likelihood of under or over charging or even charging innocent people. See 
State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711,713 (Utah 1985) (requiring that prosecutors file charges as 
10 
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soon as probable cause exists is unworkable; a prosecutor's delay in filing charges does not 
violate defendant's right to a speedy trial where no tactical advantage is gained by the 
prosecution). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected that the previous 
version of the speedy rights statute creates such a statute of limitations. Farnsworth. 519 
P.2dat246. 
In short, nothing in the speedy trial statute suggests that it was meant to modify or 
supercede the existing statutes of limitations for filing various charges. Rather, it only 
provides that, once filed, the prosecutor must be vigilant in trying the charges promptly once 
defendant properly invokes his speedy trial right. Accordingly, this statute gives defendant 
no right to hasten a prosecutor's charging decision before the charges are filed, so long as 
they are filed within the applicable limitations period. It is only after the charges are filed 
that a prosecutor's good or bad faith in getting the charges tried within 120 days after a 
properly-filed disposition request is open to scrutiny. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). 
Defendant stresses that the case against him had been "adequately investigated" by 
a single officer prior to his arrest on July 23, 1998. Br. of Aplt. at 8-9. This, however, is 
beside the point. The statute requires that an information, not charges, be "pending" at the 
time he files his disposition request. The information is pending only once it is filed with the 
court. Moreover, an "adequate investigation" for purposes of establishing probable cause to 
arrest someone is significantly different from an investigation aimed at prosecuting someone 
for multiple felonies. Defendant fails to recognize the subsequent scientific testing to which 
11 
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the evidence was subjected, including chemical and fingerprint analysis, and testing to 
establish the firing capability of the "firearm" found in the box, none of which was 
completed before to defendant's arrest (R. 333: 9; 336: 4-5; 337: 6-7, 11). Further, the 
adequacy of the investigation at the time of an arrest does not change a prosecutor's charging 
discretion or the four-year statute of limitations for filing. 
Another problem with defendant's position is that a defendant may not know the 
proper charges or court to include in his disposition request before the actual filing of the 
information, risking the possibility that his written request is ineffective to properly invoke 
the statute as to some or all of the charges. The charges against a defendant may multiply 
or change during the course of an investigation, and the failure of defendant to include any 
or all of the charges ultimately filed against him would prevent him from triggering the 
statutory time period.4 Similarly, failure to properly identify in the written request "the court 
wherein it [the charge] is pending" prevents defendant from invoking the statute. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-29-1(1). 
4Defendant claims that the charges did not change but remained constant from his 
* arrest, to the parole violation information, to his disposition request. Br. of Aplt. at 5. 
However, the charges at each of these points are not identical: the disposition request 
does not include all the charges noted at defendant's arrest and includes a charge not 
noted in either the parole violation information or the final information; the final 
information contains a charge not mentioned in the disposition request; and the parole 
violation information does not mention the clandestine lab charge noted in all the other 
written documents (R. 1-3, 50, 51, 54). I 
12 
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Hence, defendant's interpretation of the statute opens the door to potential difficulties 
that do not occur under the view that "pending" means the information u 
the court. At that point, defendant knows the exact charges ai u I - \ . aic district 
court has jurisdiction ovct flu nnitkL ami the sequence and timing of efforts to invoke the 
statute arc known U» all. ' •; •' '" • " •:. -
D. A Premature Disposition Request Is A Nullity Under Utah Supreme Court 
Precedent 
In State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447,4 s 1 (I kali h»8/i ihr I >mli Supreme ('otnl expressly 
recognized that Utah's speedy tiial statute reqilires the filing of an information or indictment 
before subn i LSMOI i I; i written disposition request in order to trigger defendant's rights under 
the statute: "[A]t the time the [written] inquiry [which defendant claimed was his disposition 
request] was sent, defendant had not yet been charged with the Weber 
no untried indictment or information was pen d i 111? a \ia i i v 11 lefendant. Thus, nothing triggered 
the statutory light to deiti-md ii-i,11 on any "untried indictment or information." See also 
Farnsworth, 519 P.2d at 246. Thus, a premature disposition request "is a nullity" and does 
not trigger the time period provided under Utah's statute. State v. Clark, 2^ \i i i 272, 
501 P.2d274 (Utah 1972) (decide*; 1 utidti lln predecessor statute 77-<>S-?.). 
In Clark, a eotnpllainl was signed and defendant was arrested on November 11,1971. 
501 P.2d at 275. Because defendant was on parole, he was returned to prison. Id. Four days 
later, defendant requested a final disposition of the matter noted in the complain! Id. 
Following a preliminary hearing on February 1. Ic)7 V defendant was hound met and an 
13 
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information filed on February 10, 1972, charging him with burglary. Id. Defendant was 
arraigned and obtained a trial setting for February 25, 1972-more than ninety days after he 
had filed his written request. Id. The day before trial, defendant moved to dismiss, claiming 
that the trial was set beyond the statutory ninety days after he filed his request. Id. The trial 
court granted the motion and dismissed the charge. Id, On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that untried charges were not "pending" at the time defendant filed his request because 
the information had not yet been filed. Id. at 276. Specifically, the Court said, "We think 
the State has ninety days from notice after an information or indictment has been filed in 
which to bring the defendant to trial in a felony case." Id (emphasis added). 
Other decisions from this and other jurisdictions support Clark's holding. See 
Belcher, 475 P.2d at 61-62 (prisoner's statutory request for final disposition of indictment 
or complaint was premature where no information or indictment charging the crimes was yet 
filed; decided under previous version of statute); see also People v. Calhoon, 897 P.2d 855, 
856-57 (Colo. App. 1994) (the existence of an untried indictment, information, or criminal 
complaint is necessary before a prisoner may invoke the statutory speedy trial provisions); 
State v. Cullen. 253 So.2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1971) (a written disposition request is a nullity 
when it is filed prior to the return of an indictment); Dennis v. Morphonios, 252 So.2d 845, 
845-46 (Fla. Dist. App. 1971) (as a matter of law, a written disposition request is ineffective 
and a nullity when it is filed prior to the filing of an information). 
14 
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Defendant cites two cases, State v. Heaton and State v. Peterson, as supporting his 
claim that "pending" as used in the speedy trial statute does not require tin: filing nt i 
complaint, information or indictment to start »••..!* • * u. at 6-8. 
However, neither case suppoi : 
In State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court focused on the 
prosecutor's burden under the statute to ensure that trial occurred within L!0 days oi the 
filing of the disposition request. However, unlike this case, Heaton kid been eharyed by a 
properly filed information, arraigned, given appointed * i nmsel, and given a timely trial date 
before lie filed Ins disposal nm request Id. at 913-14. fhe issue addressed by the Utah 
Supreme Court was whether the court-caused delay after the request constituted "good 
cause" for extending the 120-day period. Id. at 915 17. Because charges were i (early 
"pending" when Heaton filed his disposition request, thai ease is iinmateniil to the issue 
before this Court. 
Similarly, in State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). a properly filed information 
charged the defendant six days before he filed his disposition request. Id. at 422. 
Accordingly, the Court was not concerned with whether charges vi ere pending a I die lime 
the request was made i 11 s(\ >• i d, 111e Con rt. was coneernei i with the trial court's determination 
defendar aave properly filed a disposition request have a duty under the statute 
15 
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to object to the setting of a trial date beyond the 120-day period in order to preserve their 
rights under the statute. Id at 424. Hence, Petersen is no more applicable than Heaton.5 
Given Utah Supreme Court precedent requiring that an information be filed before a 
written disposition request will trigger statutory rights, and given the unambiguous language 
of the speedy trial statute, the trial court correctly held that charges are "pending" only after 
the information is filed. Defendant's disposition request was therefore premature and, hence, 
null. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 




KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
5Moreover, Petersen is open to question in light of the United States Supreme 
Court's recent decision in New York v. Hill. U.S. , , 120 S. Ct. 659, 662-66 
(2000) (defense counsel's explicit agreement to a trial date beyond the 180-day period 
provided in the interstate equivalent of a uniform speedy trial statute constitutes a waiver 
or abandonment of defendant's rights under the Agreement). 
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Titles 58 and 58A 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
History. C. 1953, 58-37d-4. enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 156, § 4; 1997, ch. 64, § 11. 
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance* 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; , 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or . < 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
58:37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 68 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
r misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
• building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
• any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
- stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
.-. (iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
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(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
' controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession qf, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
' (iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement pant, arcaae, or recreation uwnci, 
f. (vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, 1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, * 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1; 
* 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, § 1; 1996, ch. 1, 8 8; 1997, ch. 64, § 6; 1998, ch. 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, « 1; 1989, ch. 139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, § 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
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1999 R E P L A C E M E N T 
Titles 76 and 77 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
' ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, 5 2. 
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FILED 
MIROCJSTRICTCa'ar 
33 APR 26 A!! 10: 22 
NOTICE AM/':REQU^ST1 FOR DISPOSITION OF 
ri. 
PENDING CHARGES (S) 
TO: FREDERICK VANDERVEUR, DIRECTOR 
UTAH STATE PRISON/CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
NOTICE is hereby given that I, /rll tkfct I Li A &-5 &> V , 
do hereby request final disposition of any charge(s) now pending 
against me in any court in the State of Utah. , Charges of , , j \ . 
PoSS of A. C laAa^jfsAj C hx& are now pending against me in the 
\ K W . C •?«* ft sth Popart. .S/ . .C«M+y ., County, and 
request is hereby made that you forward this notice to the 
appropriate authorities in that county, together with such other 
information as required by law. 
DATED this 1-1 . date of 
Inmate^///J.o/u^J J J.M/h*M USP# 
(Signature) (/ 
I hereby certify that I received a copy of the foregoing NOTICE 
this cP day of (Cv^-Z/Tho^ , i9m 
) 
Au thori zed^Agen t ) / 
Utah State Prison 
Draper, Utah 
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'" n 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
GARY R. HEWARD, 5085 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
S S
^ " 2 AM If: 56 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-







Screened by: G. R. Heward 
Assigned to: NPE - . ,pm§ 




Case.§9l9&L,S^ P S 
The undersigned Detective McCarthy - West Valley City Police Department, Agency 
Case No. 9839532, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the 
crimes of: 
JP CL 
foflll COUNT I 
ANDESTINE LAB, A -First Degree Felony, at 2904 West 3100 South, West Valley City, 
Utah, on or about July 23, 1998, in violation of Title 58 Chapter 37d, Section 4(l)(a) 
and/or (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, in that the defendant MICHAEL 
COLE LINDSAY, a party to the offense, did possess a controlled substance precursor, to 
wit: pseudoephedrine, iodine and/or phosphorus, with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation, or did possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. 
J^ftOTICE is hereby given that the defendant is subject to an ENHANCED PENALTY pursuant to 
Title 58, chapter 37d, Sections 5(l)(d) and/or (f) and /or (g), in that the intended 
laboratory operation was to or did, take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of 
business, church, or school; and/or the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced 
any amount of a specified controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine and/or the 
intended clandestine laboratory was for the production of methamphetamine base. 
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INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v. MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY 
DAO No. 98012913 
Page 2 
* COUNT II 
JJD^  POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second Degree 
Felony, at 2904 West 3100 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 
23, 1998, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 503(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY, a party to the 
offense, did have in his possession or under his custody or control a dangerous weapon, 
to-wit: firearm, and defendant was on parole or probation for a felony. 
/
COUNT III ^ W 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a ^ Fhird-Degree Felony, at 
2904 West 3100 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 23, 1998, in 
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY, a party to the offense, 
did knowingly and intentionally have in his possession a controlled substance, to-wit* . ._ 
methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance. €wNu£, b j?(0f/c{aypo% - cfaf^uJW* 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Detective McCarthy, Agent Bennion, and David Murdock 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this information on personal knowledge, Drug Enforcement 
Administration Case No. ML 98-S048, Utah State Crime Lab # C19982767. 
Agent Bennion, Officer Billy McCarthy West Valley Police Department, Denise Davis 
AP&P, Karl Kennington AP&P, Lee Lindsay AP&P and Ed Blanchard AP&P. 
1. On July 23, 1998, Agent Bennion received information from an anonymous 
source that MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY was involved in a clandestine laboratory. 
2. On July 23, 1998, Agents Bennion, Lund Kavanagh and Altenes responded to 
MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S residence, 2904 West 3100 South, West Valley City, Utah to 
assist Adult Probation and Parole Officers with a home visit. Adult Probation and Parole 
Officers advised Agent Bennion that they suspected that a box located in the garage contained a 
clandestine laboratory. A set of keys with a tag "DAD" contained a key to the master lock on the 
box. The keys were tried and the box was opened. A search of the box revealed Red , 
Phosphorous, Ephedrine, Acetone and Alcohol . Also, various items of glassware, pumps, 
clamps, funnels, pH test strips, condenser column, blasting caps, and emergency fuses were 
found. During the search, a sawed off shotgun and shotgun shells were also located. 
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3. 2904 West 3100 South is within 500 ft of a residence. 
4. According to CIB Bennion of the DEA/Metro the chemicals and precursors 
located at 2904 West 3100 South are capable of producing methamphetamine and/or had 
produced methamphetamine. 
5. The laboratory glassware located at MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S residence 
was processed by members of the Utah State Crime Laboratory for the presence of latent 
fingerprints. Latent fingerprints were located and compared to MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S 
and found to be a match. 
6. A quantity of methamphetamine was located at MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY'S 
residence, along with paraphernalia consistent with the use/distribution of methamphetamine. 




Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, DislrictAttorney 
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GARY R. HEWARD - 5085 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Utah Attorney General 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 524-4156 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTArf / 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 991904523 FS 
Judge William W. Berrett 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered 
that Defendant Michael Cole Lindsey's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
Dated this £ day ofJjpr£ji999. 
m^v. Judge William W. berrett 
V; 
.-«*.$'»'* ?•*; ., r 
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GARY R. HEWARD - 5085 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Utah Attorney General 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 524-4156 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATEOFUTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL COLE LINDSAY 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for hearing on April 19,1999, on the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. Defendant was represented by his counsel of record James A. Valdez and the State of 
Utah was represented by Gary R. Heward. The court having heard oral argument makes the 
following: 
FILED _..„_ 
- ^ D DISTRICT C'J'JM 
99 RPR 30 !ff\0--M> 
;MTLA^DlPARTHOn 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 991904523 FS 
Judge William W. •DcrrctU 
nrmc;? 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 23,1998, Defendant Michael Cole Lindsay was arrested in Salt Lake 
County, Utah for possession of a Clandestine Laboratory. Mr. Lindsay was booked into Salt 
Lake County Jail. 
2. On July 23, 1998, Defendant Michael Cole Lindsey was a parolee from the Utah 
State Prison. Michael Cole Lindsay was returned to the Utah State Prison based upon the August 
3, 1998 filing of a parole violation by agents of the Adult Probation and Parole Office and the 
charge alleged to have occurred on July 23,1998 was one of the basis of his parole revocation. 
3. Michael Cole Lindsey's parole violation alleged the Clandestine Laboratory 
charge, along with illegally possessing and/or manufacturing firearms and explosive devices. 
4. Michael Cole Lindsey filed a Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charges pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 et seq. on October 6, 1998. 
5. Michael Cole Lindsey was charged by information on or about March 2, 1999, 
alleging a First Degree Felony, Possession of a Clandestine Laboratory occurring on July 23, 
1998. 
6. Michael Cole Lindsey filed a Pro Se Motion to Dismiss the prosecution of 
possession of a clandestine laboratory asserting his right to a speedy trial and alleging a "lack of 
seasonal prosecution" on Mach 30,1999. 
7. On April 6, 1999, James A. Valdez attorney for Defendant Michael Cole Lindsey 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the prosecution alleging a violation of Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
et seq. which requires the State to bring the defendant to trial within 120 days of receiving notice 
from the defendant requesting disposition of pending charges. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The controlling statute is Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 et seq. 
2. The Court finds that the 120 day requirement of Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 
et seq. is triggered by an information or indictment existing or pending against the defendant. 
The date of defendant's arrest and/or his filing of a request for disposition of detainer prior to 
charges being filed is irrelevant for purposes of calculating the time requirement set forth in §77-
29-1. 
3. Michael Cole Lindsey's right to be tried within 120 days of filing notice begins to 
run on the issuance of the arrest warrant by the magistrate. The arrest warrant was signed on 
March 2,1999. 
DATED t h i s ^ O day of April, 1999. 
J A R W J J E W A R D 
AssistanrAttorney General 
Approved as to form: 
tomey for Defendant \ 
3 
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SCOTT W. REED, USB #4124 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM, USB #1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for the State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1800 
GARYR.HEWARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 524-4156 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




MICHAEL COLE LINDSEY, : Case No. 991904523 FS 
Defendant, : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The matter having come before the court on July 9,1999 for hearing on the Defendant's 
Motion to Renew Motion to Dismiss, and both parties appearing through counsel, and arguments 
having been made and the court now being fully apprised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon violation 
of the Utah Detainer Statute, Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-29-1 et. sea., is denied, and the court 
approves and adopts the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge Barrett, 
F(U0 DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 16 195 
00151 
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acting as magistrate, dated May 3,1999. 
DATED this /fefeavc of July, 1999 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to 
Defendant's counsel, Kristine M. Rogers, 10 West 100 South, Suite 605, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101. 
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